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Frederic M~gret* Protecting Identity by Ignoring It? A Critical
Look at the French and Rwandan Paradoxes
This article seeks to critically examine political and legal practices of "racial
blindness" by comparing two countries that have most enthusiastically embraced
it as an official policy and even ideology: France and Rwanda. By highlighting
the differences but also the significant commonalities between the two, it seeks
to dynamically emphasize their explicit and implicit construction of race and
ethnicity The case for racial blindness is first presented in the terms in which it is
largely understood in those countries, and taken seriously as an effort to deal with
their unique legacies and political circumstances, notably as part of a desire to
transcend some of the toxic consequences of "race" and "ethnicity " However, the
clear limitations of pretending that races and ethnic groups do not exist officially
are also underlined and racial blindness is found to be wanting as a model of anti-
racism historically, functionally and in principle.
Cet article s'attache a examiner les pratiques politiques et juridiques de cecite
raciale , en comparant deux des pays qui se sont engages dans cette voie avec
le plus d'enthousiasme, a savoir la France et le Rwanda. En faisant ressortir
les differences mais aussi les similitudes entre les deux, il tente de mettre en
exergue la construction dynamique des notions de race et d'ethnicite qui en
resulte. Les politiques de cecite raciale sont dans un premier temps presentees
dans les termes selon lesquelles elles sont largement comprises dans ces pays
et prises au serieux comme partie integrante d'efforts adaptes a une histoire
et des circonstances specifiques, a m~me de transcender les consequences
toxiques de la race et de I', ethnicite. - Cependant, les limites d'un modele
consistant a pretendre que les races et les ethnies n'existent pas officiellement
sont soulignees comme ne constituant pas une posture antiraciste viable
historiquement, fonctionnellement ou par principe.
* Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, McGill University and Canada Research Chair in the Law
of Human Rights and Legal Pluralism. I am grateful to Pierre-Alexandre Cardinal for some very
helpful comments and Guilhem de Rocquefeuil for invaluable research assistance.
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Introduction
I. Protective denial of identities: The best case
II. A critique: When obfuscation of identities becomes a form of racism
Conclusion
"If ethnicity is an invention, then it can be abolished and ignored; if it
is primordial, then it is unchanging and extraneous to policy concerns;
if it is contextually defined, then it is the responsibility of the political
actors both to recognize it and to attenuate its salience as a political
force."'
"On ne nait pas noir, on le devient."2
Introduction
Race and ethnicity are sometimes understood to exist as forms of identity
that ought to be protected as such. But what precisely is the relationship of
racial and ethnic identity and the state? Human rights norms make a strong
case against negative discrimination: one ought not to suffer as a result of
one's skin colour or ethnic affiliation. But how far should the state become
involved in positively protecting such identities? In particular, should the
state be ready to identify certain groups in terms of their ethnic or racial
identities? What if in doing so it risked further entrenching irreducible
differences between citizens? When does benign blindness to certain types
of identity become a form of callous disregard for them?
The starting point of this article and its main focus is the paradoxical
character of the position that has most come to be associated with France
of formally denying, or at least ignoring, the existence of racial and ethnic
identities. This denial manifests itself, for example, in a constitutionally
protected prohibition on ethnic or racial statistics. The Republican vision
1. Catharine Newbury & David Newbury, "A Catholic Mass in Kigali: Contested Views of the
Genocide and Ethnicity in Rwanda" (1999) 33:2-3 Can J African Studies 292 at 294.
2. Jean-Louis Sagot-Duvauroux, On ne nait pas Noir, on le devient (Paris: Albin Michel, 2004).
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of a racially neutral citizenship has been the object of renewed pressure
in the last decade, notably as a result of an awakening of thought on
racialization and ethnicization in France. The denial of race and ethnicity
as relevant political categories for the state is of course not presented in
Republican discourse as a form of official racism. Quite the contrary, what
might be described as public race blindness is presented as one of the very
conditions of integration of minorities under the all-encompassing banner
of Republican citizenship. France thus stands at the polar opposite of
states that develop specific regimes for the protection of certain racialized
or ethnicized minorities, or even of states that at the very least take
into account the existence of such minorities for the purposes of policy
development and legal adjudication.
One might see such policies as simply a manifestation of a weird
French exceptionalism (or provincialism) when it comes to issues of race
and ethnicity but for two facts. First, turning a blind eye to identities in
the name of universal citizenship obviously has a long pedigree in liberal
thought. Although liberal polities have diverged over time on how they
take into account issues of difference, the model of a universal and
undiscriminating citizenship remains a strong reference, ven for countries
that significantly take into account group identities. Second, and relatedly,
France is not as alone in adopting this model as is commonly thought.
In fact, although France is arguably an extreme case of racial and ethnic
blindness, the seeming "absolute denial of the existence of races coupled
with the absence of deeper reflection on the role that race and ethnicity
and their underlying changing and adaptable assumptions still play" has
been described as endemic to the whole of Europe.3 "Racial blindness"
is, in fact, often used to describe the U.S. Supreme Court's own evolution
towards an anti-discrimination politics that does not take into account
persons' racial or ethnic affiliation,4 even though U.S. public discourse
seems so ready and willing to engage in race and ethnicity "talk."
In an effort to shed light on the larger problem and to move away from
the confines of the relatively idiosyncratic French Republican experience
and the specific problem of European racism, this article proposes to
analyze that case in parallel with a more recent and less discussed one:
that of Rwanda. Since the genocide, Rwanda has adopted a policy of
3. Costanza Hermanin, Mathias M6schel & Michele Grigolo, "Introduction: How Does Race
'Count' in Fighting Racial and Ethnic Discrimination in Europe?" in Mathias M6schel, Costanza
Hermanin & Michele Grigolo, eds, Fighting Discrimination in Europe: The Case for a Race-
Conscious Approach (London, UK: Routledge, 2013) 1 at 3.
4. Jerome McCristal Culp Jr., "Colorblind Remedies and the Intersectionality of Oppression:
Policy Arguments Masquerading as Moral Claims" (1994) 69:1 NYUL Rev 162.
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so-called Rwandicit6, the central plank of which is the need to erase all
manifestations of racialism and ethnicism. Of course, Rwanda's racial
blindness does not proceed from the same tradition of republicanism, is
deeply reactive to a particular event (the 1994 genocide) and unfolds in a
very different society structured less by the issue of immigration than the
legacy of colonialism. The comparison between France and Rwanda-
radically different as these countries' histories and experiences are-is
nonetheless meant to help problematize racial blindness beyond the
trajectory of a single country and to suggest a broader type of political
experimentation and sensitivity. The hypothesis is that there are sufficient
similarities for the comparison to make sense, yet enough differences to
help dynamically articulate some general propositions about the differing
natures of racial blindness(es).
As a preliminary matter, three broad remarks are in order. First, one
of the dangers in contemporary debates about how to deal with race and
ethnicity is a tendency to treat such concepts through a multiculturalist
lens that does not always deeply problematize them as social constructs.
Identities tend to be taken for granted (the debate being about what should
be done to protect them), and the politics of protecting them seen as quite
distinct from the production of "race" and "ethnicity" as categories. The
article will, instead, take seriously the way in which the protection of
"groups" also creates them, and contextualize this process in a continuing
history of the reification of the identity of groups requiring protection. In
other words, it will emphasize the extent to which group identity is not
(or at least not only) the problem to which group-oriented policies seek
to respond, but also the problem that they create in attempting to resolve
it, to the extent that the politics of taking cognizance of racial and ethnic
diversity retroact on the very existence of minorities.5
Second, I want to pay attention to the fact that one of the key issues
when debating racial and ethnic identity is not just whether these should
be protected in the abstract, but whether the state should have anything
to do with it. There is no reason in principle why we should think of
the state as having a role in managing identities (it historically did not
have for the longest time, at least before the state became, for all intents
and purposes, the nation-state). Of course, it is in those terms that many
states have ended up thinking of themselves in the last few centuries, long
5. An analogy here would be with well-known debates on nationalism, and whether nations pre-
existed the modem state, or whether the modem state created nations. This is obviously a fraught and
complex question that I will not tackle here, but there is a sense in which the nation-first explanations
have always been suspect of historical simplification and normative obfuscation: Craig Calhoun,
"Nationalism and Ethnicity" (1993) 19 Annual Rev Sociology 211.
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before contemporary debates on forging inclusive societies. The rise of
nationalism meant that the state was increasingly conceived as the state of
a particular people understood in racial or ethnic terms (the "Volk"). Ethnic
and racial categorizing helped reinforce cohesion to protect against "both
internal disintegration and external aggression."' Processes of exclusion
and the identification of "other" groups have been reactivated in a context
of globalization and migration.' Interestingly, post-colonial states, perhaps
saddled with messy ethnic legacies as a result of colonization, have also
seen their function in those terms. The idea of "managing" ethnic diversity
has thus gained popularity as a way of conceptualizing one of the stakes
of contemporary statehood.8 Reconnecting the centrality of the state to
practices of managing identity means also liaising with an entire tradition
of thought more interested in practices of state power and their more or
less contrived and accidental construction of race and ethnicity than ideal
theory.
Third, one important insight is that the construction of "race" and
"ethnicity" has a lot to do with the law and its operation as modality of
knowledge. The particular contribution of the law to practices of identity
management and construction is often neglected by political theorists and
scientists alike. However, there is reason to think that the law's contribution
is not simply to act as a conduit for state and social prejudices found
elsewhere. As Ian Haney Lopez put it, "the law serves not only to reflect
but to solidify social prejudice, making law a prime instrument in the
construction and reinforcement of racial subordination."9 In France, the
first article of a proposed law that would have effectively banned the use of
the word "race" in legislative instruments stated: "la Rdpublique combat
le racisme, l'antisdmitisme et la xdnophobie. Elle ne reconnait l'existence
d'aucune prdtendue race."1 In Rwanda, a law punishes "divisionism" or
6. Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Construction of Peoplehood: Racism, Nationalism, Ethnicity"
(1987) 2:2 Sociological Forum 373 at 384.
7. Stephen Castles, "How Nation-States Respond to Immigration and Ethnic Diversity" (1995)
21:3 J Ethnic & Migration Studies 293; Calvin Goldscheider, ed, Population, Ethnicity, and Nation-
Building (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995).
8. Muhammad Mushtaq, "Managing Ethnic Diversity and Federalism in Pakistan" (2009) 33:3
European J Scientific Research 279; M Shamsul Haque, "The Role of the State in Managing Ethnic
Tensions in Malaysia" (2003) 47:3 American Behavioral Scientist 240. The term "managing" is
interesting in itself; it suggests that diversity is something that is simply there and that needs to be
controlled, organized and kept to reasonable proportions.
9. Ian F Haney Lopez, "The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion,
Fabrication, and Choice" (1994) 29:1 Harv CR-CLL Rev 1 at 3.
10. "Ce n'est pas le mot race dans les textes qui alimente le racisme," Le Monde (17 May 2013),
online: <www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2013/05/17/ce-n-est-pas-le-mot-race-dans-les-textes-qui-
alimente-le-racisme 3295510 3224.html>. Although the law has to date not been adopted, it was
approved by the National Assembly on the 16 May 2013.
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"sectarianism" by anyone bold enough to resurrect the dreaded Tutsi/Hutu
distinction.11 The law effectively is thus called upon to provide a bulwark
against identity claims based on race or ethnicity.
The article therefore proposes to critically assess the soundness of
the particular trajectories of racial blindness illustrated by France and
Rwanda by taking them seriously on the one hand, but exposing them to
contemporary thinking on race, racism and discrimination on the other.
What lies in the refusal to name groups and the failure to acknowledge
certain forms of racial or ethnic identity, and on what grounds can it be
defended and challenged? The article proceeds in two steps. First, it seeks
to take practices of race and ethnic blindness seriously by evaluating them
in their context in order to develop a sort of best case for them. In particular,
part I highlights the troublesome origins of racial and ethnic identification
as part of a number of "darker legacies" of state intervention in the realm of
identity, darker legacies which from Vichy collaborationism with the Nazis
to the Rwandan genocide are at least partly shared. In part II, the article
nonetheless finds actual practices of denial of racial and ethnic identity to
be deeply problematic on their own terms and in general. Although part
II argues that there is more to the resistance to such categorization than
simply a refusal to see the obvious, it also suggests that the French and
Rwandan approaches are, at best, the wrong answer to a real problem.
I. Protective denial of identities: The best case
Although hardly absent, ideas of "colour blindness" in the U.S. and in
Canada operate in a context where visible minorities are commonly
acknowledged as a matter of law and policy; by comparison, they have
been at the very heart of officially condoned policies in countries such as
France and Rwanda. Although such policies notably in their French variant
are often derided as implausible in much of the Anglo-American world,
this section will try to take them seriously as long-term efforts to think
through issues of race and identity and how they relate to the organization
of society. How do policies of racial and ethnic blindness come about, and
what are their justifications? Here the similarities and differences between
France and Rwanda must be drawn out carefully.
France is a country with a long tradition of formal and legal ethnic
blindness that has nonetheless always coexisted with forms of social
and political racism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism. France built itself,
particularly after the Revolution, on a concept of national and civic
11. Republic of Rwanda, Law n' 4712001 of 1811212001 Instituting Punishment for Offences of
Discrimination and Sectarianism, Official Gazette, online: University of Texas Digital Repository
<repo sitories.lib.utexas.edu/bitstream/handle/2152/4935/4040.pdf>.
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identity that saw the central government increasingly assimilate provinces
into a common identity. Although the model found its limits with slaves
in the Caribbean and colonial expansion more generally, it paved the
way for a very unitary and Jacobin concept of citizenship that envisages
individuals as being theoretically assimilated into the polity regardless of
their skin colour, language, religious beliefs and so on. This model was a
deep reaction to an ancien regime society in which identification and the
juridical status that flowed from it had been primarily based on class. It
also reflected, of course, the ability of the central power to successfully
impose this Republican compromise on what was quite a diverse country.
Where racial blindness is a relatively late post-civil rights reaction in
the U.S. (where it helped pave the way, in some specific contexts, from
extreme racialism to race denialism), it can at least claim a long and
continuous tradition in France, to the point of coming very close to an
official ideology.12
In the last 50 years, in a context of post-war migration and
diversification of French society, the debate on the nature of citizenship
and France's relationship to its minorities has nonetheless re-emerged.
Most recently, debates on the hijab and on how to deal with the Roma
have served as veritable lightning rods for debates on French and minority
identity. The use of ethnic statistics, in particular, has precipitated a debate
that has been described as being of a "rare violence."13 Asked about the
constitutionality of the production of data that would denote the racial or
ethnic origins of persons, the Conseil constitutionnel censored the law on
that point, arguing that it ran against article 1 of the Constitution and the
value of equality.14 As has been seen, efforts were launched to expunge
the word "race" from French codified law, including the Constitution,
lest "race" provide a basis for racism.15 Even if such efforts have stalled,
it is important to note that this was not because of an embrace of the
reality of race and ethnicity as socially constitutive categories; rather it
was because of a feeling that further stipulating such an absence from
the law was superfluous given how committed the polity is to treating
these categories as not politically operative. Although its racial blindness
12. See article 1 of the French Constitution of 4 October 1958 (Texte integral de la Constitution du
4 octobre 1958 en vigueur, JO, 5 October 1958, 9151, art 1).
13. Patrick Simon, "The Choice of Ignorance: The Debate on Ethnic and Racial Statistics in France"
(2008) 26:1 French Politics, Culture & Society 7 at 7, 9.
14. Cons const, 15 November 2007, (2007) Rec 360, 2007-557 DC.
15. Harvey Morris, "France Fights Racism by Outlawing 'Race"' (17 May 2013), IHTRendevous
(blog), online: <http://rendezvous.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/ 5/17/france-fights-mcism-by-outlawing-
race/>.
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is constantly challenged by the extreme right-and even, as will be seen,
by some minority members themselves-as wrongheaded and naive, it
holds a unique sway on French political imagination. Legally, this ethnic
blindness of course does not extend to prohibiting discussion of racial
and ethnic issues, but it certainly has a chilling effect on taking race or
ethnicity into account in public discourse.
Rwanda embraced its own form of racial and ethnic blindness through
a very different route but with not entirely dissimilar results. Rwanda
is a young country, previously a German and then Belgian colony, that
has a history of officially condoned racial and ethnic separation that
remains deeply associated with the 1994 genocide. Its evolution towards
a supposedly rigorously non-ethnic society is, in fact, a post-genocide
development, and more explicitly corrective to an over-ethnicized past.
One might have thought that the victory of the Rwandan Patriotic Front
("RPF") would have translated into a rehabilitation of the Tutsi, at least as
a socially constructed form of identity, now further solidified, if nothing
else, by the experience of genocide. However, at least on the surface,
the new Rwandan government chose an entirely different path: a form
of relatively forceful de-ethnicization though the denial of the continued
existence of the, however constructed, Tutsi and Hutu identities.16 The
post-genocide project has thus been very much one of construction of
a civic nationalism, as well as an attempt to forge a truly post-colonial
identity. It has led the country to embark on a vigorous path of ethnic and
racial denial with a view to creating a unified form of citizenship and a
common form of Rwandan identity promoted as "Rwandicit."
Hence perhaps paradoxically, post-genocide Rwanda, which has been
dominated by an anglophone and anglophile Tutsi diaspora, has adopted
with a vengeance a model of national construction that is very much
like the model of (otherwise much hated) France. Irony aside, Rwanda's
purported de-ethnicization is justified on higher grounds of avoiding a
repeat of the genocide by denying any expression to some of the conditions
that characterized pre-genocide Rwanda. As such, it is not just a measure
of political prophylaxis but also more deeply an epistemological challenge
to what had gradually become the accepted view by many in the years
running up to the genocide, namely that Rwandan society was defined by
its opposition between the Tutsi and Hutu ethnic groups. Its laws on the
matter are much harsher than French laws in that they repress the crime
of "ethnicism" defined vaguely as the use of ethnic categories in public.
16. Andrea Purdekova, "Building a Nation in Rwanda? De-ethnicisation and its Discontents" (2008)
8:3 Studies Ethnicity & Nationalism 502.
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This section proposes to take these evolutions and projects at face
value, in an effort to judge them on their own conceptual terms. Moreover,
it proposes to make the best case for them, that is, to assume that they are
in good faith and that the claims made on their behalf are at least minimally
credible. In this respect, the argument will not necessarily be the same
as the one effectively produced by the French and Rwandan authorities,
although it will include many of the ideas that are typically adduced in
both contexts. What, then, can we make of such projects, different as they
are?
There is of course the problem that claims that "there are no ethnic
groups in France or Rwanda" do not pass the laugh test and immediately
appear as part of a very dubious politics of invisibility. For example, before
the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women in
2009, the Rwandan delegate affirmed that "[t]he country of Rwanda does
not have Pygmy children.1 7 While this is presumably better than reducing
pygmy children to their ethnicity as part of a process of extermination,
it is also callous and nonsensical. Similarly, the French government has
been repeatedly excoriated by international human rights treaty bodies
for failing to acknowledge the existence of minorities. The Human Rights
Committee, for example, commenting on France's periodic report, insisted
that it "remains unable to share [France's view] that the abstract principle
of equality before the law and the prohibition of discrimination represent
sufficient guarantees for the equal and effective enjoyment by persons
belonging to ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities of the rights set out
in the [International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights]."18 There is a
sense of a profound denial of reality involved in a-ethnic policies in multi-
ethnic societies.
However, we should perhaps not make too much of this descriptive
implausibility. The claim should be construed as much more normative and
political rather than strictly social-scientific. No one could accuse anyone
in France or Rwanda, least of all in government circles, of not knowing
there are minorities in their midst. The arguments typically adduced
against ethnic differentiation in official statistics, policy, law and even
public discourse have to do with theproject of creating forms of citizenship
17. Zoe Gray, "The Importance of Ethnic Data for Promoting the Right to Education" in Minority
Rights Group International, State of the World's Minorities and Indigenous Peoples 2009: Events of
2008 (London, UK: Minority Rights Group International, 2009) 54 at 56, online: <minorityrights.org/
publications/state-of-the-worlds-minorities-and-indigenous-peoples-2009-july-2009/>.
18. Human Rights Committee, Consideration ofReports Submitted by States Parties under Article
40 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee, France, UNHRC,
93rd Sess, UN Doc CCPR/C/FRA/CO/4 (2008) at para 11.
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that do not marginalize or victimize minorities. Indeed, they are explicitly
and emphatically rooted in anti-racist ideas that see projects of nation-
building as the best protection against marginalization of minorities. For
example, the rapporteur of the law banning the word "race" from French
law before the French Assembly insisted: "[1]e concept de race, chacun
le reconnait, a servi de fondement aux pires ideologies et a conduit i la
mort de millions d'6tres humains. Ce concept scientifiquement aberrant
n'a pas sa place dans l'ordre juridique, m~me si c'est pour condamner
toute discrimination fondde sur une prdtendue race."19 Similarly, the
Commission nationale de l'informatique et des libertds, the main official
privacy watchdog, flagged a series of problems associated with developing
ethno-racial categories in France, such as "[r]isques de renforcement
des stdrdotypes, de stigmatisation, de communautarisme, classification
incertaine, non scientifique, rdductrice, approximative."20 Similarly, the
Rwandan experience is very much rooted in the notion that it was the very
racial engineering of the Hutu and Tutsi concepts that sowed the seeds of
pogroms and genocides in the 20th century. Evidently such enterprises
require at the very least the possibility of designating certain groups as
such.
More fundamentally therefore, the reluctance to think and talk in terms
of race and ethnicity reflects the deeply held belief that these concepts are
more than problematic, that they are, in fact, at the very root of racist,
colonial and even genocidal policies. In that respect, French and Rwandan
thinking illustrate a particular sensitivity that ties the critique of racial and
ethnic identification to various darker legacies of ethnic identification,
which has proved considerably influential. Interestingly, that critique is
based on the fact that various regimes of oppression of racial minorities
have been nominally defended on the basis of the need to protect such
minorities. For example, as Wally Morrow suggests in the South African
context:
We think of colonialism and Apartheid as so thoroughly unjust and
evil that it is difficult for us to imagine that they could once have been
plausibly defended, and by people of good will. A constant theme in
the official justifications for these oppressive regimes was the need to
recognise and respect he differences between the different groups which
19. France, JO, Assemblee nationale, Debats parlementaires, Compte rendu integral, 2nd session of
16 May 2013, at 5349 (Alfred Marie-Jeanne).
20. France, Commission nationale de l'informatique et des libertes, Mesure de la diversite et
protection des donn~es personnelles: Les dix recommandations de la CNIL, at 7 (16 May 2007),
online: CNIL <www.cnil.fr/fileadmin/documents/Communications/communicationVD15.052 vu
parADEBET.pdf> [CNIL].
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compose the society, and to protect and perpetuate group integrity.2
Practices of group identification have thus often been framed in
benevolent and paternalistic language (at least at first) that professed to
care for minorities (and which, as such, even found occasional willing
collaborators within the minorities in question). At the same time, there
is no doubt that these benevolent discourses coexisted with a practice of
severing the relevant groups from the benefits of citizenship, in some cases
explicitly aiming to stunt their development by consigning them to their
own supposedly inescapable and backward "culture." As a judge once
put it, "[i]t is an understatement to note that attempts to place individuals
in distinct racial groups frequently serve only to facilitate continued
discrimination and postpone the day when all individuals will be addressed
as such."22
For example, even the Nuremberg laws were at the time understood
in ambiguous terms, with the Reich emphasizing that "the German people
has [sic] no objection to the Jew as long as he wishes to be a member
of the Jewish people and acts accordingly," such that "the new laws
could be perceived as offering German Jews the opportunity to establish
themselves as a 'national minority' comparable to discriminated minorities
in other countries" with some Jews "even regard[ing] the legal solution as
somewhat acceptable."23 Indeed, even the "Jewish Final Solution" long
remained cloaked in rhetoric about facilitating Jewish "emigration" to a
homeland. To this day, the separate education of Roma children in some
countries of Eastern Europe, which has been found to be incompatible with
their right to education and to be free from discrimination, is presented as
remedial action designed to address educational disadvantages.24 Many
cases of differential treatment may really be discrimination in sheep's
clothing.
In that respect, both French and Rwandan practices of racial/ethnic
blindness are powerfully shaped by the notion that racial and ethnic
identification have close associations with these darker legacies, and
in particular the looming presence of genocide and its memory. French
thinking on the issue in particular is deeply influenced by the notion that
21. Wally Morrow, "Multicultural Education in South Africa" in Wally Morrow & Kenneth King,
eds, ision and Reality: Changing Education and Training in South Africa (Cape Town: University of
Cape Town Press, 1998) 232 at 234 [emphasis added].
22. Shaare Tefila Congregation v Cobb, 785 F (2d) 523 at 533 (4th Cir 1986).
23. Ronald J Berger, Fathoming the Holocaust: A Social Problems Approach (New York: Aldine de
Gruyter, 2002) at 40.
24. Helen O'Nions, "Different and Unequal: The Educational Segregation of Roma Pupils in
Europe" (2010) 21:1 Intercultural Education 1.
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Vichy's identification of its Jewish citizens as Jewish led to deportation
and France's contribution to the Holocaust. The role of legal racial/
ethnic classification in promoting genocidal enterprises (often virtually
indistinguishable from colonization) is also well documented. The
Holocaust relied heavily on the demographic statistics which included
racial or ethnic identification compiled by various European states." In
effect, anti-Semitic laws legally enacted the ethnic categories that they
intended to discriminate against. Vichy France, in particular, made the
question of Jewishness into a more explicitly racial issue. Quite apart from
what it led to (i.e., the marginalization of Jews from French society, itself
leading to the Holocaust), the 3 October 1940 loi portant statut desjuifs
is perhaps most notable for our purposes for creating a legal category of
"the Jew." The specific importance of this legal designation is that it made
Jews in France-henceforth "Juifs selon la loi"-particularly identifiable,
and therefore vulnerable.26 The issue of ethnic statistics in more recent
times has therefore perhaps unsurprisingly brought to the fore powerful
invocations of the Vichy precedent. Fadela Amara, the former leader of a
famous anti-racist organization Ni putes ni soumises, insisted for example
that "[p]lus personne ne doit porter l'6toile jaune."2 At stake here is an
almost compulsive use of slippery slope arguments and the idea that any
breach in the Republican consensus will inevitably take France down a
path of communitarianism, ghettoization and worse.
In Rwanda, where genocide seemingly occurred yesterday and still
deeply structures daily reality and where "ethnicism" is understood as the
very foundation of genocide, the fear that classifications will lead down
that path is of course not merely a vue de 1'esprit. If nothing else, ID
cards were used at roadblocks during the genocide to identify victims
to perpetrators. Racialist thinking had so penetrated the psyche of Hum
extremists that the threat of the RPF became inseparable from a vision of
the entire Tutsi community as an existential threat to the country. In the
years leading to the genocide, extremist groups powerfully stoked tensions
and prepared the ground for massacres by reifying ethnic categories and
presenting them as deeply irreducible.
25. William Seltzer, "Population Statistics, the Holocaust, and the Nuremberg Trials" (1998) 24:3
Population & Development Rev 511 at 513-515.
26. Philippe Fabre, "L'identite legale des Juifs sous Vichy: La contribution des juges" (2000) 7
Labyrinthe 23 at 23, 24.
27. "Statistiques ethniques: Amara desavoue Sabeg," Le Nouvel Observateur (16 March 2009),
online: <tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/politique/20090316.OBS8960/statistiques-ethniques-amara-
desavoue-sabeg.html>.
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In both France and Rwanda, in addition, the identification of persons on
the basis of their supposed ethnic and racial identity is faulted not so much
for highlighting as for perversely creating these identities in the first place.
Indeed, to understand Rwandan and French resistance to identification,
one must locate them in a deeper critique of the fundamental facticity of
racial and ethnic identity. While it may be a simplification to say that race
did not exist before the 19th century, it is certainly true that the particular
concept of race as a phenotypical essence of individuals and groups from
which a number of characteristics could be inferred only emerged by
that time. Race, famously described by Ashley Montagu as "man's most
dangerous myth,"28 is based on a biologization of identity and ascribes to
superficial features a determining role in behaviour.2 9 Biological ideas are
often mixed with scriptural interpretation to produce a potent and deadly
mix.3" There are arguably distant common origins to and more than a
passing resemblance between anti-Semitism and anti-Tutsism.
As a biological category with social-scientific explanatory value,
race has been thoroughly discredited. Ethnicity is at least focused less on
biology than on shared cultural features, but it can be as uncompromising
in its sentiment that "cultures" are sustained by organic groups that are
largely irreducible to each other. In fact, "ethnicity" is widely believed to
have overtaken "race" as a coded expression for racial groups. The very
meaning of categories such as race is constantly contested and changing
of course,31 but the suspicion is that the concept's history is so tied to these
earlier legacies as to be irredeemable.
This critique of the facticity of race and ethnicity, then, is linked to
a critique of racialist thinking and its production of race as an ordering
concept.32 It is almost impossible to think of race historically independent
of mechanisms of domination and exclusion. The discourse on race in
particular is impossible to distinguish from the justification of the colonial
enterprise, the "civilizing mission" and the superiority of the West.33 It
28. Ashley Montagu, Man ' Most Dangerous Myth: The Fallacy ofRace, 6th ed (Walnut Creek, CA:
AltaMira Press, 1997).
29. Audrey Smedley & Brian D Smedley, "Race as Biology Is Fiction, Racism as a Social Problem
Is Real: Anthropological and Historical Perspectives on the Social Construction of Race" (2005) 60:1
American Psychologist 16.
30. Leon Poliakov, The Aryan Myth: A History of Racist and Nationalistic Ideas in Europe (New
York: Basic Books, 1974).
31. Michael A Omi, "The Changing Meaning of Race" in Neil J Smelser, William Julius Wilson &
Faith Mitchell, eds, America Becoming: Racial Trends and Their Consequences, vol 1 (Washington,
DC: National Academy Press, 2001) 243.
32. Anibal Quijano, "Coloniality and Modernity/Rationality" (2007) 21:2-3 Cultural Studies 168.
33. Oliver Cromwell Cox, Caste, Class, andRace: A Study in Social Dynamics (New York: Monthly
Review Press, 1959).
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served to separate the world into spheres, to locate allies in regions that
were being conquered and to bring the colonized countries into systems
of exploitation and forced labour. Indeed, the justification of slavery
needed race as an intellectual conceit.34 Race and ethnicity were therefore
produced for certain purposes of domination that are hard to ignore.
France and Rwanda offer opposing perspectives from which to view
the development of race as a constitutive category. For France, largely
oblivious to its own racializing past, the enduring myth of universal
French citizenship even in colonial dependencies has safeguarded the
notion that the "mission civilisatrice" was not inherently racist. Moreover,
the official rejection of race as a category further cemented the notion of
a continuity between the Republic and its Empire, through the appeal to
the wholesome abstraction of citizenship and a sense of shared destiny
between mdtropole and periphery. In other words, race acts as the great
refoulk of the tradition of French Republican thought-one that, as we will
see, may help sideline questions of actual oppression and exclusion, but
also safeguards a precious fiction.
On the receiving end of (Belgian) colonialism in Rwanda, the
distinction between Hums and Tutsis is, conversely, largely seen as an
artefact of the colonial project. If anything, the idea that the "Tutsi" are an
ethnic as opposed to social group is a by-product of colonization. Belgian
colonizers projected onto what had been a relatively fluid categorization
in pre-colonial Rwanda, allowing for exogamy and founded, if anything,
on socioeconomic status, their ideas about races (and even the Flemish/
Walloon rivalry which was itself understood in strong ethnic terms). The
Hutu became associated with the Bantu who lived in the Congo Basin,
while the Tutsi were identified with inhabitants of the Nile. Colonial
authorities relied on the Tutsi for indirect rule and thereby "intensified
the connection between race and power."" The post-independence
governments, dominated by the Hutu, appropriated these stereotypes
and contributed to their further entrenchment, even as they inversed the
relationship of power, for example, through a system of quotas seeking to
limit the Tutsis' influence. In other words, the Rwandan colonial legacy
makes evident through a more explicit foregrounding of race what the
French colonial past sought to obscure through its discursive obfuscation
of race. The current post-genocide Rwandan policy can be seen as an
34. George M Fredrickson, The Arrogance ofRace: Historical Perspectives on Slavery, Racism, and
Social Inequality (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1988).
35. Scott Straus, The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 2006) at 22.
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attempt to deal with this colonial racial legacy by radically turning its back
on it and in so doing embracing a form of racial-blindness that is evocative
of France's own trajectory.
In the more radical critique of racial and ethnic identification that
one can detect in France and Rwanda, then, it is the identification that
creates the identity, not the other way round. Racial and ethnic identity
attribution is seen as clearly more than an exercise in spotting what is
unproblematically already there. Rather, in many respects, it is the attempt
at classification that creates racial and ethnic thought. There are no races
or ethnic groups struggling to btain recognition. Instead what we see is a
process in which the state first takes the initiative in delineating racial and
ethnic groups as part of its strategies of control and power and, notably, of
national identity construction, typically highlighting the relative position
of different racial/ethnic groups within the state. This is clear in post-
independence Rwanda where the highlighting of "Hutuness" provided a
foundation for the contention that the Hutus represented the majority and
should therefore rule the country. It is also apparent in the Vichy regime's
"revolution nationale," and promotion of a French identity against the
corrupting influences of the Jews. Hence the need to situate issues of race
and ethnicity not so much within intra-social relations between already
hypothetically constituted racial and ethnic communities, but within a
tradition of sociology of the state that emphasizes the productive (and
almost inevitably, under that view, nefarious) character of racializing
practices.36
Under such a perspective, there is no reason to think even the most
seemingly innocuous measures of identification, such as ethnic or racial
statistics, will not involve deep methodological and epistemological
problems. They will, for example, inevitably rely on simplifications of
a complex, moving reality and entrench divisions." This is evident
in Rwanda, where it has been argued that the Belgians themselves,
after doing much to accredit the theory that there were Tutsi and Hum
ethnicities, could not actually determine who belonged to each group, and
eventually settled for an arbitrary material criterion (those with more than
10 head of cattle would be considered Tutsi) that seemed to disprove the
36. Moon-Kie Jung & Tomas Almaguer, "The State and the Production of Racial Categories" in
Rodney D Coates, ed, Race andEthnicity: Across Time, Space andDiscipline (Boston: Brill, 2004) 55.
37. Patrick Simon, "Collecting Ethnic Statistics in Europe: A Review" (2012) 35:8 Ethnic & Racial
Studies 1366.
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very ethnic basis of the categorization.38 It is also evident in the byzantine
classifications of Vichy France, and the absurdities to which the attempt to
legally define Jewishness led.39 The goal, then, should be to dismantle the
racial-categoization apparatus by ceasing to rely on it altogether for any
classificatory purpose.
This explains the fear that, even in the course of protecting certain
groups, their stable and permanent reality will be affirmed more than would
be intellectually wise. In other words, that benevolent ethno-attention
will produce malevolent ethno-reification.° This self-realizing prophecy
aspect of racial and ethnic identification-the idea, for example, that
"[i]n time the creation of a new ordering of society by the census will act to
reshape that which the census sought to merely describe"41-is precisely
what has been seen as problematic.42 In France, Herv6 le Bras has argued
that ethnicity is part "d'anciennes croyances pr6-scientifiques analogues
i la croyance dans les fant6mes ou les esprits" such that ethnic statistics,
by a sort of boomerang effect, "l6gitimeraient et habitueraient les Frangais
i penser en ces termes, puis, i la longue, i se ddfinir de cette manibre
d'autant plus facilement que cette tendance existe ddji i l'6tat latent."43 In
the extreme, the argument is that racial identification prepares the grounds
for the racist backlash of the extreme right.44 Anti-racism that adopts the
language of race, then, feeds racism.
More specifically, the critique of the fundamental facticity of racial
and ethnic identities proceeds from and reinforces three narratives that
combine a mix of analytic and normative arguments. First, it is part of
a national and state construction narrative that sees racial and ethnic
identities as obstacles to an otherwise desirable project of political unity.
38. Paul J Magnarella, "The Hutu-Tutsi Conflict in Rwanda" in Santosh C Saha, ed, Perspectives
on Contemporary Ethnic Conflict: Primal Violence or the Politics of Conviction? (Lanham, MD:
Lexington Books, 2006) 107.
39. Denis Broussolle, "L'elaboration du statut des Juifs de 1940" (1996) 30-31 Genre Humain 115.
40. AnnLouise Keating, "Interrogating 'Whiteness,' (De)Constructing 'Race"' (1995) 57:8 College
English 901.
41. Kenneth W Jones, "Religious Identity and the Indian Census" in N Gerald Barrier, The Census
in British India: New Perspectives (New Delhi: Manohar, 1981) 73, cited in AJ Christopher, "The
Commonwealth Censuses: Partial Insights into Issues of Identity" (2013) 51:3 Commonwealth &
Comparative Politics 326 at 328.
42. Alexander Stille, "Can the French Talk About Race?," The New Yorker (11 July 2014), online:
<www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/can-the-french-talk-about-race>.
43. "La Republique Franqaise a l'epreuve des statistiques ethnique: Les chercheurs," online:
Sciences Po <controverses.sciences-po.fr/archive/statistiquesethniques/chercheurs.php>; "Inutiles
statistiques ethniques, par Herve Le Bras," Le Monde (14 July 2009), online: <www.lemonde.fr/idees/
article/2009/07/14/inutiles-statistiques-ethniques-par-herve-le-bras 1218638 3232.html>.
44. Paul Yonnet, Voyage au centre du malaise franqais: L 'antiracisme t le roman national (Paris:
Gallimard, 1993).
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What one might describe as the traditional French fear ofmulticulturalism
can be understood as a fear that over-investing in race and ethnicity will
ultimately create a prison house of beliefs about race and ethnicity as
the dominant forms of identification, closing off other possibilities for
citizen identification. This then links up with specifically French fears
of communautarisme, almost invariably seen in France as having deeply
troublesome connotations. Ultimately, identity politics would take France
(and, indeed, perhaps any other society) on the road to the destruction
of society. France fears ghettoization and a culture of collective rights
that will largely erase commonality. Paradoxically though, this fear of
dissolution from within is also a fear of dissolution into a U.S.-dominated
world fantasized more or less correctly as more communitarian. In the
case of Rwanda, "ethnicism" is also very clearly seen as an obstacle to
the emergence of a Rwandan citizenship, perhaps with even more urgency
given its traumatic past and fragile present. In particular, an excessive
emphasis on the anti-Tutsi character of the genocide might well diminish
the extent to which, for example, moderate Hutus also were targeted, thus
closing-off prospects for inclusive citizenship.
Second, the concern with racial and ethnic identification is conceivably
linked to a liberal worry with the trampling of individual wishes and
identity, particularly of the "minority within the minority" (notably those
who do not want to identify themselves as being members of that minority).
The existence of legalized racial/ethnic identities, so the argument goes,
will invite the state to police and act as ultimate arbiter of group affiliation
in ways that will invariably, at least measured against the aspirations of
particular individuals, end up being under- or over-inclusive. Under-
inclusive because some people who identify themselves as members of
the group will turn out to be denied membership in it; over-inclusive
because people will be included in the category who have no wish to be so,
putting them in a position where they have no choice but to be considered
members of a group regardless of their self-identification. More generally,
state-enforced ethnic affiliations are viewed with suspicion as unable
to deal with the Mdtis, mulattos, mixed-bloods, mischlings and so on.45
This will create impossible situations for those individuals who do not fit
neatly within categories, ejecting at the periphery of political concerns the
relatively large numbers of those whose identity cannot be easily captured
45. The only notable exception is South American countries where "mestisaje" is often at least
presented as the dominant identity, albeit "the myth of racial innocence" may also conveniently serve
to marginalize the reality of racial oppression Tanya Kateri Hernandez, Racial Subordination in Latin
America: The Role of the State, Customary Law, and the New Civil Rights Response (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2013).
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by even well-meaning initiatives to protect identity and minorities.46 The
disciplining of identities thus seems intrinsically linked to practices of
violence and oppression. This is particularly the case when law, with its
distinct tendency to answer questions of race in black and white, so to
speak, is involved."
Here, pre-genocide Rwanda stands out as the country in which the
unilateral ascription of ethnicity prioritized communitarian and state
criteria over self-identification in deeply problematic ways. Children of
mixed marriages, for example, would inherit the ethnicity of the father,
thus leaving half of their identity hidden. During the genocide they were
either targeted as Tutsi (if their father was Tutsi) or forced to take sides
with the Hutu (if their father was Hutu) against their own Tutsi relatives
(including, in some cases, their mother). In Vichy France, the "contentieux
des juifs" at least suggested a similar arbitrariness with identification,
making Jewishness the result of a pseudo-scientific calculation of the
number of Jewish grandparents. By contrast, particularly in French public
discourse, the retreat to a neutral concept of citizenship is presented as better
protecting individuals against such tragic choices or state arbitrariness.
Yazid Sabeg, the dynamic French Commissaire i la diversit6 et i l'6galit6
des chances, himself a product of North African immigration, has insisted
on a series of measures (e.g., anonymity, voluntarism) so that statistics
prevent that "quiconque ne soit ou ne se sente enferm6 dans une identit6
particulire."48
Third, in addition to this liberal approach to racial blindness, there
is also a distinct left-wing tradition in French public discourse that
essentially faults race as obfuscating the material-economic element of
social conflicts. The focus on race and ethnicity can also be understood as
a gross level of analysis mistake that obscures, rather than clarifies, social
phenomena by seeing race and ethnicity as causal when they are merely
consequential. In that respect, race and ethnicity have long been suspected
by a Marxist/leftist tradition of acting as a diversion from what should be
a deeper engagement with economic and cultural inequality, most notably
as it manifests itself in the form of social classes. If anything, race and
ethnicity have a role in the ideological superstructure, but cannot as such
explain the real structure of society and are less autonomous concepts than
46. Cookie White Stephan & Walter G Stephan, "The Measurement of Racial and Ethnic Identity"
(2000) 24:5 Intl J Intercultural Relations 541.
47. Haney Lopez, supra note 9 at 3.
48. France, Commissariat a la diversite et a l'egalite des chances, Programme d'action et
recommandations pour la diversite et / 'egalite des chances, by Yazid Sabeg (May 2009) at 46.
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they are expressions of underlying struggles.49 It is therefore not the state
that is doing minorities a favour by allowing them to practice their culture,
but minorities who are doing the state a favour by reproducing group
hierarchies woven into the fabric of capitalism.
The ensuing emphasis on identity and the need to protect it highlights
the issue as the relatively superficial one of "our prejudices," rather than
the result of our social system, and therefore is ultimately exculpatory.5"
In its extreme variants, the discourse has race and ethnicity serve as
manifestations of a form of false-consciousness by which artificial and
"tribal" solidarities are activated in ways that prevent broader forms of
solidarity, particularly along class lines. Underthis view, race oppression is
also directed at poor members of the dominant racial group (i.e., typically,
whites) to alienate them from those who would be their natural class allies.
For example, "white supremacy" has been presented as "an ideology used
by the wealthy and powerful to fool the white poor into being more race-
loyal than class-loyal, blinding them to their own interests."51 Conversely,
interesting evidence points out the transformative potential of class-based
and inter-racial solidarity to break the "color-caste system" over parallel
social but racially exclusive organization."
Such views are influential in France where the newfound emphasis
on diversity in public debate is sometimes presented as distracting from
the real economic issues of wage inequality.53 In the Rwandan context,
a critique of the dominant reading of the genocide has emerged that
goes beyond colonial ethnic constructions and instead emphasizes the
genocide's specifically economic and political determinants.54 As Johan
49. Immanuel Wallerstein has for example argued that one of the uses of "ethnicity" is to reinforce
occupational hierarchies of the workforce in which particular groups come to see certain activities
as ones they are naturally suited to. In essence, the modem state outsources to ethnic groups modes
of particularistic socialization that its formal commitment to equality would not allow it to promote,
especially not at school. As a result, "what is illegitimate for the state to do comes in by the rear
window as 'voluntary' group behavior defending a social 'identity"': Wallerstein, supra note 6 at 386.
50. Walter Benn Michaels, The Trouble with Diversity: How We Learned to Love Identity and Ignore
Inequality (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006); Walter Benn Michaels, "Against Diversity" (2008)
52 New Left Rev 33.
51. Linda MartinAlcoff, "What Should White People Do?" (1998) 13:3 Hypatia 6 at 14.
52. Maurice Zeitlin & L Frank Weyher, "'Black and White: Unite and Fight': Interracial Working-
Class Solidarity and Racial Employment Equality" (2001) 107:2 American J Sociology 430 at 432.
53. "Walter Benn Michaels: Diversity is Insufficient" (March 2009) (podcast), online: Le Monde
Diplomatique <mondediplo.com/2009/03/lldiversitypodcast>; Lotfi Bel Hadj, "Diversite, le
labyrinthe racial" (5 April 2009), posted on Loyi Bel Hadj, online: Facebook <https://www.facebook.
com/notes/lotfi-bel-hadj/diversit%/C30 oA9-le-labyrinthe-mcial/137036839668155>; Vincent Geisser
& El Yamine Soum, Discriminer pour mieux regner: Enquete sur la diversite dans lespartis politiques
(Ivry-sur-Seine: Editions de l'Atelier, 2008).
54. Newbury & Newbury, supra note 1 at 312-313.
568 The Dalhousie Law Journal
Pottier put it, "[t]he eruption of conflict and civil war in the 1990s, in both
Rwanda and eastern Zaire, had its origin in modern struggles for power
and wealth" that are ultimately traceable to "[t]he power of shamelessly
twisted ethnic argument for the sake of class privilege."5 5 Demographic
pressure, lack of land and the decline of the price of commodities such
as coffee all contributed to create an explosive situation.56 Of course, on
its own terms such an analysis does not necessarily dispute the operative
effect of a category such as ethnicity, but it does portray it as fundamentally
derivative of a material infrastructure.
II. A critique: When obfuscation of identities becomes a form of racism
What, then, should one make of this tendency to turn a blind eye to race
and ethnicity? How does it fare, even in its best form, as a specifically
anti-racist posture in view of evolving global debates about the nature of
race, racism and anti-racism? Drawing on debates that have been more
prominent in the Anglo-Ameican tradition, this section will seek to
gradually tease out some of the blind spots and limitations of the French
and Rwandan postures.
To understand the potential problems of the denial of race/ethnicity in
the French and Rwandan context, one must dig deeper into some of the
fraught normative foundations of the project of unitary civic citizenship.
Many of the critiques of racial blindness, notably as they have emerged as
part of the US legal debate, come under the heading of what Avery Gordon
and Christopher Newfield have described as a form of "liberal racism"
which
[R]ejects discrimination on the basis of race or color and abhors the
subjection of groups or individuals on racial grounds. But it upholds and
defends systems that produce racializing effects... it treats the categories
through which racism operates, is felt, and is addressed as conceptual
errors. It thus directs less attention to the histories, current forms, and
social effects of racism (though it agrees racism is a problem) than to the
problems of race and racial identity, categories it considers politically
troubling and intellectually flawed. Liberal racial thinking seeks to go
"beyond race" and does not support mcialized perspectives on racism on
the grounds that they are a kind of reverse racism."
55. Johan Pottier, Re-Imagining Rwanda: Conflict, Survival and Disinformation in the Late
Twentieth Century (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002) at 9.
56. Isaac A Kamola, "The Global Coffee Economy and the Production of Genocide in Rwanda"
(2007) 28:3 Third World Q 571.
57. Avery Gordon & Christopher Newfield, "White Philosophy" (1994) 20:4 Critical Inquiry 737 at
737-738.
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A first critique in that vein might, for example, point out that although
racial blindness can certainly be rationalized as a way of avoiding some of
the pitfalls of racial and ethnic categorization, that is not the same thing as
saying that racially blind policies were actually adopted for that purpose.
Nor is there any reason to presume good faith, take liberal principles at
face value, or hypothesize that they are truly guiding policies as opposed
to sophisticated rationalizations. In Rwanda, the opportunism of ethnic
blindness is less evident given its claimed motivation in avoiding a repeat
of a tragedy of the immediate past. In France, however, there is arguably
something disingenuous about the extremes to which the discourse of
racial blindness has been taken under the guise of avoiding another Vichy.
For example, France had adhered to an abstract concept of civil citizenship
long before the issue of how to deal with diversified immigration occurred,
for reasons that had little to do with those invoked in contemporary debate,
and that may, notably, be inimical to a modem agenda of inclusion of
minorities. Indeed, the defensive reactivation in France of the discourse
of civic citizenship arguably owes less to a continuous evaluation of the
Vichy legacy than to a perceived need to close ranks in the context of
threatening globalization, a deeply ambivalent relation to immigration
from former colonies, not to mention an almost Pavlovian suspicion of
post-colonial ideas in vogue in the Anglo-American world from the 1980s
onward.8 The problem of racial or ethnic reification may be a very real
one, but racial blindness is not necessarily the response to it that it claims
to be.
More importantly, France's Republican assimilationist agenda in effect
long coexisted with actual exclusion based on race and ethnicity,59 making
the contemporary case for neutral citizenship in order to avoid reifying
categories and imposing individual identification a particularly ambiguous
one. For example, slavery was reintroduced in the French colonies after
being briefly banned during the Revolution. When colonial France found it
convenient to develop ethnic statistics for its dependencies, it did so without
much concern for Republican principles.6" Nor did ethnic blindness before
Vichy protect France from severe bouts of anti-Semitism. While it may
have been the official and legal policy, this does not mean that attention
to race did not powerfully shape currents of thought and the reality of
58. Alec G Hargreaves, "Chemins de traverse: Vers une reconnaissance de la postcolonialite en
France" (2007) 51:3 Mouvements 24.
59. Jean-Luc Bonniol, "Racialisation? Le cas de la colorisation coloniale des rapports sociaux"
(2007) 6 Faire Savoirs, Sciences Humaines & Sociales en Region PACA 37.
60. Kamel Kateb, "La gestion statistique des populations dans l'empire colonial frangais: Le cas de
l'Algerie, 1830-1960" (1998) 13:102 Histoire & Mesure 77.
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relations of social domination.61 The suspicion thus emerges over time that
racial blindness is less about avoiding some of the pitfalls and excesses
of classification (as claimed in the "best case") than it is about ignoring
race and ethnicity for the wrong reasons.62 In fact, racial blindness may
conveniently help deproblematize race relations and serve as little more
than a "legitimizing ideology."63 Where in Rwanda ethnic blindness is part
of an effort, however misguided it may otherwise be in its manifestations,
to move beyond the obvious colonial roots of the Hutu/Tutsi dichotomy,
in France racial blindness manifests a deep continuity with its colonial
past. Nonetheless, it is not implausible even in Rwanda and despite the
a priori more justifiable and recent character of anti-ethnicism there, that
it effectively only serves to deproblematize under a national abstraction
the relative exclusion and marginalization from power of the Hutu. This
is nowhere more visible, for example, than in the commemoration of the
genocide, notably in schools, as exclusively against Tutsis at the expense
of Hutu victims.64
Second, we cannot easily assume that processes of de-ethnicization
are free of their own ethnic bias and are not in fact a more or less covert
agenda of pushing one national-ethnic project at the expense of minorities.
In fact, de-ethnicization of a sort may be merely replaced by some form of
ethnic nationalism. As McCrudden and O'Leary put it:
[W]hat is deemed to be civic is rarely devoid of ethnic content and
therefore rarely neutral. The civic is rarely a true fusion of diverse ethnic
influences; it is more usually a "secularized" version of the culture of
the dominant group.... The dominant group, or the most likely dominant
group, tends to define itself as civic and to deem its minority challengers
as ethnic. Differently put, when the dominant ethnic group controls
public institutions, it is able to define what is "civic." 65
For example, as the work of Andrea Purdekovdi has shown, the de-
ethnicization of post-genocide Rwanda has really been another form of
61. Gerard Noiriel, "'Color blindness' et construction des identites dans l'espace public frangais" in
Didier Fassin & Eric Fassin, eds, De la question sociale a la question raciale? Reprsenter la societe
franqaise (Paris: Decouverte, 2006) 158.
62. Herrick Chapman & Laura L Frader, eds, Race in France: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on the
Politics ofDifJference (New York: Berghahn Books, 2004).
63. Helen A Neville, "Rationalizing the Racial Order: Racial Color-Blindness as a Legitimizing
Ideology" in Theodore Koditschek, Sundiata Keita Cha-Jua & Helen A Neville, Race Struggles
(Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2009) 115 at 115.
64. Alia Dharssi, "New Seeds of Conflict: 20 Years Post-Genocide, There Are Fears That Rwandan
Schools Ferment Hate," National Post (17 April 2014), online: <news.nationalpost.com/news/new-
seeds-of-conflict-20-years-post-genocide-there-are-fears-than-rwandan-schools-ferment-hate>.
65. Christopher McCrudden & Brendan O'Leary, Courts and Consociations: Human Rights versus
Power-Sharing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) at 131.
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national re-ethnicization. Rwanda did not so much make the transition
from ethnic-based allegiances to civic-based ones, as the switch from
several ethnic identifications to a national one, based on a reimagined vision
of a pre-colonial Rwandan ethnos. This construction has been criticized as
largely arbitrary and historically tendentious. What this reminds us is that
the republican state's own identity is often framed in the same univocal
terms that it decries: nationalism, even abstract universalist nationalism,
often partakes in the project of foregrounding a particular group. We thus
have reason to be sceptical of processes of de-ethnicization which are in
essence part of an identity grab, in diverse societies, by one ethnic group
over others, even though they may be more or less subtle about it (for
example, the "tutsification" of Rwanda67 or Israel as a "Jewish" state).
In fact, even in cases where the de-ethnicization is more clearly
framed as linked to the construction of a polity based on civic citizenship,
it will often be hard to exclude some lingering element of more or less
covert ethnic nationalism. For example, in France the official discourse
on Republican citizenship in practice coexists and has always coexisted
with a popular discourse with strong nativist undertones about who is
really French. Racial blindness is often only prevalent within a particular
elite, and at times not even there. Moreover, political citizenship in France
has long coincided with actual patterns of exclusion based on racial or
ethnic stereotyping, which, for example, effectively excluded black and
Arab former colonial subjects from citizen assimilation. In fact, even a
concept of political citizenship can, over time, develop its own quasi-
ethnic undertones, as if attachment to certain values defined the French
nation in exclusive terms in relation to an "other" (i.e., the migrant)
that is increasingly seen as incapable of assimilation because he holds
fundamentally incommensurable values. It is notable in this context that
one commentator of the Conseil constitutionnel decision which struck
down the provision of a law that would have permitted ethnic statistics
praised the Conseil for acting as an "interpr~te du pacte politique et social
frangais" and notably the "mythe fondateur: l'6galit6 rdpublicaine,""6
almost as if ethnic differentiation hurt Frenchness more than the fight
66. Purdekova, supra note 16.
67. Eugenia Zorbas, "Reconciliation in Post-Genocide Rwanda" (2004) 1:1 African J Leg Studies 29
at 44.
68. Ferdinand Melin-Soucramanien, "Le Conseil constitutionnel defenseur de l'egalite republicaine
contre les 'classifications suspectes"' (2007) 43 Recueil Dalloz 3017 at 3018.
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against racism. In contemporary Rwanda, being Rwandan is often
understood by the Hutu as being Tutsi.69
Indeed, because the politics of civic citizenship are suspected of being
for a particular political group, they are also naturally suspected of being
against others. The politics of building a political citizenship may draw on
processes of differentiation within and without the polity that have clear
distributive costs. Some-those who do not fit into the newly dominant
national values-will be asked to sacrifice more than those who implicitly
already correspond to the national socio-type. For all their apparent
neutrality, universal and civil policies are occasionally specifically
designated at denying minorities certain rights. In France, for example,
laws that apply equally to all on their face are regularly suspected of being
conceived with certain minorities in mind and therefore a significant factor
in indirect discrimination.
Several examples come to mind. First, the debate on the veil (hijab,
chador, etc.) was often a thinly disguised attempt at targeting a particular
group that could not be explicitly designated in ethnic terms, but in a
context in which everyone understood who was referenced (i.e., Muslim
women). The second example is the gypsies of France. The category
"gens du voyage" in French law presents itself as applicable to all kinds
of nomads when, in effect, it is implicitly understood to apply exclusively
to the Roma.7 ' Even when laws are not explicitly conceived as applying
to certain groups, administrative or police practices may reorient them in
that direction (for example, ethnic profiling in the post 9/11 context in
France). 7 ' Third, while the dominant a-racial narrative in Rwanda has not
gone as far as to make it impossible to talk about the genocide in ethnic
terms, it has contributed to the exclusion in the post-genocide context of
69. Larissa R Begley, "Resolved to Fight the Ideology of Genocide and All of Its Manifestations":
The Rwandan Patriotic Front, Violence and Ethnic Marginalisation in Post-Genocide Rwanda and
Eastern Congo (DPhil Thesis, University of Sussex School of Global Studies, 2011) [unpublished] at
156.
70. See Christophe Robert, "Le discours sur les 'gens du voyage' dans les enceintes parlementaires"
(2000) 155 Recherche Sociale 7.
71. The North African minority is much more likely to be stopped and searched in France: Indira
Goris, Fabien Jobard & Rene Levy, Profiling Minorities: A Study of Stop-and-Search Practices in
Paris (New York: Open Society Institute, 2009) at 10. Interestingly, while ethnic statistics are generally
prohibited, the one agency to make use of them in France is the Direction centrale du renseignement
interieur, which does so for security reasons. It is as if statistics were seen as less problematic when
they permit the further surveillance of certain minority groups.
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the narrative of the indigenous Twa as a henceforth unrecognized and
almost invisible group.
72
Third, in some contexts the denial of ethnic identity raises familiar
liberal concerns linked to human rights and the protection of basic
liberties. The denial of identity is prone to and dependent on violence. This
is as evident in the construction of France (and, to a degree, its colonial
expansion) as it is in the construction of post-genocide Rwanda. The
symbolic violence of republican-assimilationist ideals lies in the degree to
which one's belonging to a group other than the nation may be a significant
part of individual experience. It decrees from above the relevant identity
on the basis of the needs of a particular national project rather than what
may be the aspirations of some individuals. Put simply, identities that are
not reducible to the national one are sidelined, their existence minimized.
In France this has historically translated into the official marginalization
of minority languages, the reduction of minority cultures to folklore, and
the regimenting into a unitary identity.
As Stanislas Marie Adelaide, Comte de Clermont-Tonnerre argued
on 23 December 1789 in the French National Assembly, "[w]e must
refuse everything to the Jews as a nation and accord everything to Jews
as individuals .... It is repugnant to have in the state... a nation within a
nation." 3 In this quotation it is evident that the French nation is the relevant
unit-the "we" is the subject, whereas the Jews are the object. Identity
is relegated entirely to the private sphere, and is seen as incompatible
with the affirmation of collective existence within the public sphere. To
partake in the nation as a full citizen was typically framed, particularly
in the colonial context, as exclusive of other seriously practiced cultural
affiliations. Although colonized peoples might exercise citizenship, it was
always as a result of forsaking their non-French identities and acculturating
thoroughly. This basic pattern has re-emerged in post-colonial France,
where citizenship is increasingly seen as something that should result from
a prior process of thorough acculturation. In other words, the universalism
implicit in the concept of citizenship is in practice dependent on new
entrants being considered "sufficiently like us" to partake in the life of the
polity.
Notably, the construction of a civic identity may in many cases depend
greatly on a form of authoritarian politics. In Rwanda, there is little doubt
72. Danielle Beswick, "Democracy, Identity and the Politics of Exclusion in Post-Genocide
Rwanda: The Case of the Batwa" (2011) 18:2 Democratization 490; Susan M Thomson, "Ethnic Twa
and Rwandan National Unity and Reconciliation Policy" (2009) 21:3 Peace Rev J Social Justice 313.
73. Natan Sznaider, Jewish Memory and the Cosmopolitan Order: Hannah Arendt and the Jewish
Condition (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2011) at 1848 [emphasis added].
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that "whilst public expression of political identities has been largely
'de-racialized', this has been done in a very top-down and authoritarian
manner."74 In effect, the prohibition of "ethnicism" in Rwanda, as arguably
in the rest of the African continent,v5 is an instrument wielded by the
government to ban opposition political parties76 and to shrink political
space.77 It has the effect of stifling expression about legitimate grievances,
and indeed may even compromise the very memory of the genocide by
giving a distorted view of its causes.79 The trial and conviction of political
opponent and presidential hopeful Victoire Ingabire, in particular, has
illustrated the difficulty of fully shedding light on the grievances of the
Hum in a context where to even mention ethnicity puts one at risk.
More generally, the Kagame regime has used the fear of ethnicism to
portray the curtailing of civil and political rights as necessary to manage
ethnic tensions."0 Even policies of reconciliation may appear to have a
dark side when carried out under the slightly Orwellian auspices of an
authoritarian government, one prone, for example, to organize re-education
camps to help create the new "Rwandans." The laws that criminalize
"divisionism," "genocide ideology" and "sectarianism," are wielded
quite arbitrarily by the authorities.1 In the case of the Twa of Rwanda,
the government has gone so far as to threaten withdrawing funding from
non-governmental organizations as long as the group is designated as an
indigenous minority.
One of the dangers of this oppressive refoulement of identities is that
they will re-emerge with a vengeance. In France, the rise of the National
Front can be seen as paradoxically profiting from a Republican discourse
that shuns racializing processes, and in the process allows institutional
74. Helen Hintjens, "Post-Genocide Identity Politics in Rwanda" (2008) 8:1 Ethnicities 5 at 6.
75. Matthij s Bogaards, Matthias Basedau & Christof Hartmann, "Ethnic Party Bans in Africa: An
Introduction" (2010) 17:4 Democratization 599 at 606-608.
76. Peter Niesen, "Political Party Bans in Rwanda 1994-2003: Three Narratives of Justification"
(2010) 17:4 Democratization 709.
77. Constance Morrill, "Show Business and 'Lawfare' in Rwanda: Twelve Years after the Genocide"
(2006) 53:3 Dissent 14 at 17.
78. Susanne Buckley-Zistel, "Dividing and Uniting: The Use of Citizenship Discourses in Conflict
and Reconciliation in Rwanda" (2006) 20:1 Global Society 101.
79. Rene Lemarchand, "The Politics of Memory in Post-Genocide Rwanda" in Phil Clark &
Zachary D Kaufman, eds, After Genocide: Transitional Justice, Post-Conflict Reconstruction and
Reconciliation in Rwanda and Beyond (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009) 65.
80. Fred Cowell, "Participatory Rights in Rwanda: Genocide Ideology Laws and the Future of
Political Space" in Maddalena Campioni & Patrick Noack, eds, Rwanda Fast Forward: Social,
Economic, Military and Reconciliation Prospects (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012) 45.
81. Amnesty International, Safer to Stay Silent: The Chilling Effect ofRwanda ' Laws on 'Genocide
Ideology' and 'Sectarianism' (London, UK: Amnesty International, 2010) at 7, online: Amnesty
International <www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/afr470052010en.pdf>.
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racism to prosper." Although the two are often presented as being at
loggerheads, they in fact share a certain affinity, and may even make each
other possible. Similarly, there is something ominous about Rwanda's
ethnic denialism and some have expressed the fear that in the education
context it might "inhibit disagreements-including potentially productive
ones-for fear of their erupting into larger and more destructive conflict"
in ways that "might actually lay the foundation for further societal
violence. "83
Fourth, the denial of ethnic identity for the purposes of better
integrating minorities should ultimately be assessed functionally on its
merits. The question is not simply whether it is the right policy in the
abstract, but whether it works in terms of its own stated goals, namely
to do away with racializing and ethnicizing thought. In that respect, the
verdict of observers on Rwanda is typically gloomy. It has been noted,
for example, that "as much as the former regime was overly vested in the
idea of Hum supremacy, these state contemporary practices perpetuate in
a much more tacit fashion what they are supposedly eradicating-Hum
and Tutsi sub-cultures or awareness."84 This is partly ascribed to the toxic
silence that then inevitably surrounds issues of ethnicity:
[A]voiding reference to ethnicity has allowed participants to avoid
addressing directly the nature of ethnicity in Rwandan social process.
Ironically, this approach has allowed popular stereotypes to thrive and
has contributed to a policy which implicates individuals on corporate
ethnic grounds, such that the worst excesses of members of one group
are extended to all members of that group, on both sides."'
Indeed, much anecdotal evidence suggests that racial blindness has
had, if not exactly the opposite of the effect intended, a tendency to merely
push racial and ethnic identification below athin surface,86 that leaves space
for a complex of coded references (victims/perpetrators, French/English
speakers, etc.). Others have contended that while ethnic blindness may
favour local coexistence in the short erm, it also inhibits the emergence of
strong critical discourses that would deal with some of the cleavages that
82. M Wieviorka, "Racisme, racialisation et ethnicisation en France: Cites, diversite, disparites:
quelques mecanismes de segregation" (1996) 1195 Hommes & Migrations 27.
83. Sarah Warshauer Freedman et al, "Teaching History after Identity-Based Conflicts: The Rwanda
Experience" (2008) 52:4 Comparative Education Rev 663 at 665.
84. Bert Ingelaere, "Peasants, Power and Ethnicity: A Bottom-Up Perspective on Rwanda's Political
Transition" (2010) 109:435 African Affairs 273 at 291.
85. Newbury & Newbury, supra note 1 at 294.
86. Josh Kron, "For Rwandan Students, Ethnic Tensions Lurk," New York Times (16 May 2010),
online: <www.nytimes.com/2010/05/17/world/africa/17rwanda.html>.
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led to the genocide in the first place,87 leading to parallels between ultra-
ethnicized pre-1994 Rwanda and its superficially ultra-de-ethnicized,
post-1994 version. The trend towards "pathologizing African identity-
discourse" has been challenged as obfuscating frank engagement with
some of the sources of inequality and violence.88 Ironically then, abstract
universalist discourse is guilty of the same sin of obfuscation that it accuses
its adversaries of, because in decontextualizing conflicts that clearly have
racialized and ethnicized dynamics (be they proxies for deeper material
struggles) it makes it impossible to begin to understand them. This is no
small irony given, for example, the Rwandan government's otherwise
consistently stated absolute goal of avoiding a repetition of genocide.
In France, the refusal to entertain notions of race and ethnicity in official
discourse even for the purposes offighting racial and ethnic discrimination
has arguably deprived the fight against discrimination of what would be its
minimum conditions of knowledge. One cannot fight what one does not
know or refuses to see. Or rather, to be more precise, the denial of race and
ethnicity as rational categories of public administration has recast racism
as the fundamentally irrational activity of a few (for example, members
of the National Front and racist "petits blancs") who are accordingly (and
of course rightly) stigmatized while entirely ignoring the role of race and
ethnicity as diffuse markers of structural discrimination.8 9 Racism is made
to appear abnormal rather than endemic. In Rwanda the focus on criminal
repression, powerfully reinforced by the post-genocide transitional justice
project, also reinforces a sense that racism is the doing of the g~nocidaires
alone rather than anything more fundamental.
At any rate, even if the project were taken at face value and did not
appear on its face to be a vehicle for some underlying discriminatory
program, its social engineering formula (i.e., stop talking about things
and they will go away) is simplistic at best. It appears as little more than
a recipe for inaction and is thus easily suspected of being "aveugle au
racisme" rather than "aveugle d la race."9 In practice, racial blindness
coexists with the continuing influence of race and ethnicity as structuring
forces in the French and Rwandan public spheres.
87. Susanne Buckley-Zistel, "Remembering to Forget: Chosen Amnesia as a Strategy for Local
Coexistence in Post-Genocide Rwanda" (2006)76:2 Africa 131 at 131, 147.
88. Dylan Craig & Nomalanga Mkhize, "Vocal Killers, Silent Killers: Popular Media, Genocide, and
the Call for Benevolent Censorship in Rwanda" in Michael Drewett & Martin Cloonan, eds, Popular
Music Censorship in Africa (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006) 39 at 40.
89. Moschel, Hermanin & Grigolo, supra note 3.
90. Eric Fassin, "Aveugles a la race ou au racisme: Une approche strategique" in Fassin & Fassin,
supra note 61, 106.
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But there is more to this than the mere failure to equip the state and the
public sphere with the right administrative and political tools to understand
the claims made in the name of race and ethnicity. Racial blindness has
more specifically historical and historiographical consequences. Even as
a society may aspire to put its more explicitly discriminatory past behind
it, the insistence that race and ethnicity do not exist today (even if it were
true) can quickly lead to the claim that they did not exist yesterday either,
through a sort of retrospective and profoundly revisionist rewriting of
history. It makes it impossible to identify members of certain minorities as
having suffered specifically from past events of oppression, lestthe equality
between citizens be challenged by what is understood as, fundamentally,
an identity claim. In that respect, the reluctance to acknowledge the
presence of victimized minorities in its midst has caught France wrong-
footed in terms of dealing with its slave-owning and colonial past.91 In
being blind, therefore, it also risks being deaf to the demands for justice
that are advanced by historically victimized communities, who are at best
accused of disrupting the Republican consensus, and at worst of being
ungrateful communitarians who threaten the country's unity.92 That this is
ultimately an untenable situation is shown by the fact that the Republic was
eventually forced to acknowledge its responsibility for the deportation of
Jews during the Vichy period who were, needless to say, not treated simply
as French citizens but were targeted because of their Jewishness. However,
thus far this has not led to similar recognition of France's responsibility for
la traite des n~gres in the context of suspicion surrounding the emergence
of a black constituency within the Republic.93
In Rwanda, it is of course impossible to deny the Tutsi their victim
status as a result of the defence of the Rwandanit6, but the project to effect
past-looking reparations is clearly in tension with the forward-looking goal
of constructing a de-ethnicized society. At every turn, a purportedly de-
ethnicized society will be reminded-will, in fact, have to remind itself-
that not so long ago pseudo-ethnic categories were used to kill a particular
group, in ways that powerfully re-inscribe the notion that these categories
were not made from thin air. As a result, either victims will be sacrificed
91. Said Bouamama & Pierre Tevanian, "Peut-on parler d'un racisme post-colonial?" in Pascal
Blanchard & Nicolas Bancel, Culture post-coloniale 1961 2006: Traces et memoires coloniales en
France (Paris: Autrement, 2006) 243.
92. Magali Bessone, Reparer les injustices coloniales: Perspective transitionnelle sur la justice
reparatrice (2015) [unpublished, archived at GRIPP Montreal].
93. This is even though, unlike French Jews, victims of French slavery and colonization were clearly
not French citizens at the time and therefore would have even less reason to be loyal to a Republic that
excluded them.
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and asked not to put forward claims based on their ethnicity that seem
to belie the forward-looking project of reconstruction, or they will push
their claims in ways that make a univocal account of Rwandanit6 highly
problematic. In effect, commemorations of the genocide in post-genocide
Rwanda offer the somewhat incongruous spectacle of a post-ethnic society
very much honouring the ethnicized victims of the genocide, in ways
that simultaneously reinforce and undermine the official reconciliation
discourse by making it incongruous and "disabl[ing] comprehension"94 of
the genocide.
Fifth, the neglect of racial and ethnic identities by the state must be
evaluated in light of claims made by minorities for the recognition of
such identities and the increasing real world gap between the theory of
racial blindness and the practice of racial self-identification. In effect, the
failure of assimilationist policies is often betrayed by the performative
manifestation of racial and ethnic identity of certain groups. In France,
it could be argued that the quite surprising recent activation of ethnic
discourses that had been effectively suppressed for decades is a reaction
to the failure of the integrationist civic citizenship promise." Of course,
the mere manifestation of claims for recognition is not a sufficient reason
to recognize them. Nonetheless, the failure of the project of neglecting
ethnicity in favour of abstract citizenship is put in stark contrast when
such minorities argue (which they sometimes do) at cross-purposes with
the state over that very issue, and thus seem to constantly belie the myth
of neutral citizenship.
Individual and collective self-identification by minorities themselves
in (partially) ethnic and racial terms is bound to be a thorn in the heel of
projects of racial and ethnic blindness. If the argument for civic citizenship
is ultimately the protection of groups through a sort of liberal dissolution
into the corps national, then why do such groups, speaking from what
one would assume to be their privileged standpoint to understand what
discriminations they suffer from, denounce the (in their eyes) empty
promise of civic citizenship? This is ultimately the puzzle that the race/
ethnic skeptic must address: the continuing popularity of these notions
even among those who, on one reading at least, are or have been the
94. Jens Meierhenrich, "Topographies of Remembering and Forgetting: The Transformation of
'Lieux de Memoire' in Rwanda" in Scott Straus & Lars Waldorf, Remaking Rwanda: State Building
and Human Rights after Mass Violence (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2011) 283 at
288.
95. ChristianPoiret, "Les processus d'ethnicisation et de raci(ali)sation dans la France contemporaine:
Africains, Ultramarins et 'Noirs"' (2011) 27:1 Revue Europeene des Migrations Internationales 107;
Jean Bouleque et al, "Les 'Noirs' de France, une invention utile?" [2007] 6 Esprit 86.
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victims of them, and even in a context where we have come to be sceptical
of such notions describing much that is real in the way they were supposed
to operate. The risk of an over-racialized or over-ethnicized reading of
society, then, should be appreciated in a context in which groups argue
vocally for the taking into account of their identity, or at least do not
straightforwardly reject the labels that are being ascribed to them. Indeed,
when neutral-on-their-face laws operate against a background of daily
discrimination, notably in the private sphere, it may be only a matter of
time before minorities reactivate identities that are quite clearly framed as
a response to the disappointments of civic citizenship.96
This support (by members of racialized and ethnicized groups
themselves) must be accounted for in ways that are non-paternalistic and
do not simply assume political alienation. The discourse of racial "false
consciousness," and in certain cases the reproach of minorities contributing
in their own way to "racist ideology," needs to be critically unpacked.
Although for obvious reasons no one is clamouring to be recognized as
a Hutu in Rwanda today, the Twa at least insist that their identity, if it
is ignored, will be erased. Some groups in France, notably blacks and
"beurs" (second or third generation North Africans) are vociferous about
their "right to be recognized." This cannot simply be blamed on a failure
to understand the promise of civic citizenship, especially not in a context
in which such demands are the product of bottom-up mobilization and
the result of intra-community political debate.97 Indeed, one could argue
that the professed racial blindness of some (typically elite) minority group
members is itself a form of "false consciousness"-a tendency to work for
oneself and one's group by deliberately minimizing race and ethnicity as
grounds of actual discrimination. By pretending that one is already in a
racially blind society, one may only seek to weaken the group solidarity of
those for whom it has not realized its promises.
Sixth, and perhaps most crucially, absolute racial blindness only
prospers as a position because it relies (like all racialist thought) on an
impoverished concept of race and ethnicity in the first place. It takes at
face value race and ethnicity's most narrow, problematic and out-dated
understandings, to then better ignore the profound traces they have left
in society. Starting from the assumption that race particularly, but also
96. See, for example, Parti des Indig&nes de la Republic, "L'appel des indigenes: Nous sommes
les indigenes de la Republique!" (January 2005), online: <indigenes-republique.fr/le-p-i-r/appel-des-
indigenes-de-la-republique/>.
97. Soline Laplance-Servigne, De l'experience du racisme a sa politisation : mobilisations et
representation des "'victims" en France et en Allemagne aujourd'hui (PhD Thesis, Institut d'ltudes
Politiques de Paris, 2011) [unpublished].
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ethnicity, are deeply misguided intellectual enterprises, the liberal anti-
racialist (or even the dogmatic Marxist anti-racialist) claims to close
centuries of racial and ethnic erring by simply abandoning (in the case
of Rwanda) or persistently ignoring (in the case of France) any use of the
notion. The poor concept of race typically implicit in race blindness then
leads to an impoverished concept of racism. If racism is only understood
as a form of subjective and conscious feeling of racial superiority (even
a manifestation of personal evil), then it can easily be reduced to the
problems of racists and extremists rather than a question of ideology.9"
Conversely, the extent to which racism operates on a structural level, is
contained in institutions, laws and language, and lives independently and
perhaps in the shadow of anti-racism, is minimized.99
What is missing is a sense that race and ethnicity retain power as
social signifiers long after they have exhausted any definite and reliable
scientific meaning. If nothing else, racial ideology goes on to structure
social interactions and creates ideological realities of its own.1"' It would
be a bitter historical irony indeed if groups that are the objective victims
of processes of racialization and ethnicization were denied protection
on the basis that we had in the meantime (conveniently) ceased to
believe in the criteria of their objective recognizability."' Moreover,
race and socioeconomic status are not competing factors but categories
that powerfully complement each other,0 2 one of the great lessons of
intersectionality.0 3 Indeed, it is possible to conceive a materialist theory of
race, one which sees different groups as competing for resources without
being blindsided by its apparently more superficial cultural and ideological
components.0 4 For example, issues that were once largely of a material
98. Colette Guillaumin, Un aspect de / 'alterite sociale: le racisme: Genese de / 'ideologie raciste et
langage actuel (Doctoral Thesis, Universite de Paris, 1969) [unpublished].
99. Moschel, Hermanin & Grigolo, supra note 3.
100. Michael C Dawson, Black Visions: The Roots of Contemporary African-American Political
Ideologies (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001).
101. It is worth noting that in almost every case before international criminal tribunals where
individuals were prosecuted for genocide, they argued that the group in question did not fall under
the Genocide Convention's definition of "protected groups." This was also the case before the
International Court of Justice where the Republic of Yugoslavia challenged Bosnia's contention that
Muslims were a distinct ethnic group.
102. Jeremy Seekings, "The Continuing Salience of Race: Discrimination and Diversity and South
Africa" (2008) 26:1 J Contemporary African Studies 1.
103. Sumi Cho, Kimberle Williams Crenshaw & Leslie McCall, "Toward a Field of Intersectionality
Studies: Theory, Applications, and Praxis" (2013) 38:4 Signs 785.
104. Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, White Supremacy andRacism in the Post-Civil Rights Era (Boulder, CO:
Lynne Rienner, 2001).
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nature may "take a life of their own" as ethno-racial constructs."'5 Strands
of Marxist theory have increasingly sought to articulate concepts of race
and ethnicity that do not reduce them to class.
10 6
In this context, it seems that the French intelligentsia, with few
exceptions, has stood on the sidelines of decades of problematization
of what race means as a social and political category, rather than as a
biological concept. Minorities in France are racialized even if they
are clearly not unproblematically racial or ethnic in the 19th century
meaning of the terms, because they are constituted as such by cultural,
historical, political and social processes. Although voices on the margin
are trying to bring critical race theory to bear on the analysis of the French
predicament,07 these remain isolated in view of both the solidity of the
Republican consensus and, it should be said, minorities' own hesitation
about the degree to which they want to invest in labels such as race and
ethnicity to disrupt that consensus. It is nonetheless likely that the failure
to take into account the racialized reality of France is condemned to
reproduce racialization, unwittingly or not.
The situation of Rwanda is perhaps the most interesting in this respect
because, through the repression of genocide, it has had to simultaneously
struggle with the scientific dubiousness and real-world concreteness
of labels such as "Tutsi" and "Hutu." The terms obviously created a
somewhat puzzling problem for the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda that was tasked by the international community to prosecute
the leading authors of the genocide. Was the genocide not, after all, the
product of the very reification of dubious and contested racial and ethnic
categories? Was there not a very real risk that the Tribunal would hand Hutu
extremists an implicit victory by accepting the position about the reality
of ethnic divisions that racist theoreticians had held for almost a century?
At the same time, denying the Tutsi victims some form of ethnicity would
have deprived them of the protection of the Genocide Convention; yet,
evidently, the Tutsi were killed and they were killed as a result of being
105. Michael Omi & Howard Winant, "Onthe Theoretical Status of the Concept of Race" in Cameron
McCarthy & Warren Crichlow, eds, Race, Identity and Representation in Education (New York:
Routledge, 1993) 3 at 5.
106. John Solomos, "Varieties of Marxist Conceptions of 'Race,' Class and the State: A Critical
Analysis" in John Rex & David Mason, eds, Theories of Race and Ethnic Relations (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1986); Charles W Mills, From Class to Race: Essays in White Marxism
and Black Radicalism (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003).
107. Houria Bouteldja & Sadri Khiari, Nous sommes les indigenes de la Republique (Paris: Editions
Amsterdam, 2012); Magali Bessone, Sans distinction de race? Une analyse critique du concept de
race et de ses effets pratiques (Paris: J Vrin, 2013); Mathias Moschel, "Color Blindness or Total
Blindness? The Absence of Critical Race Theory in Europe" (2007) 9:1 Rutgers Race & L Rev 57.
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Tutsi. In the Rutaganda decision, the Tribunal sought to transcend these
limitations by holding that
for the purposes of applying the Genocide Convention, membership
of a group is, in essence, a subjective rather than an objective concept.
The victim is perceived by the perpetrator of genocide as belonging to a
group slated for destruction. In some instances, the victim may perceive
himself/herself as belonging to the said group.'
Although the Tribunal has since seemed to endow ethnic and
racial groups with a more objective existence"9 lest certain individuals
problematically self-identify as members of groups with dubious reality,
this case law does hint significantly at a legal notion of ethnicity (and
no doubt the same work could have been done with race) that is fluid
and contingent, one linked to self-perception and an encounter with one's
tormentor, rather than essential and objective. To those who believe that
race and ethnicity have been so debunked that any attempt to combat
racism that does not give up entirely on the concept of race and ethnicity
is suspected of being racist, it brings a significant retort in the form of
rescuing race and ethnicity as forms of contingent identity that continue
to have a nefarious influence long after they have exhausted their original
pseudoscientific meaning.
The most promising trend, then, is one that aligns the law's protection
of minorities with the more sophisticated understanding of race and
ethnicity as forms of subjective racialized and ethnicized identity. Such an
effort cannot be suspected of reifying such concepts, since it is precisely
about combatting their socially constructed and persistent legacies and
disputes any contention that they are biologically determinate. It is worth
noting that, even in France, serious official attempts have been made to
show that group identification (in the context of ethnic statistics) need not
be racist precisely as long as it is based on a "ressenti" of discriminations
rather than subsumption in some pre-existing racial or ethnic categories.1
Ultimately, it is hard to escape the conclusion that racial blindness can
become a form of racism in which the facticity and fluidity of concepts
108. Prosecutor v Georges Anderson Nderubumwe Rutaganda, ICTR-96-3-T, Judgement and
Sentence (6 December 1999) at para 56 (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Trial Chamber
I), online: UN Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals <unictr.unmict.org/sites/unictr.org/
files/case-documents/ictr-96-3/trial-judgements/en/991206.pdf>.
109. Rebecca Young, "How Do We Know Them When We See Them? The Subjective Evolution in
the Identification of Victim Groups for the Purpose of Genocide" (2010) 10:1 Intl Crim L Rev 1.
110. CNIL, supra note 20 at 4. See also France, Comite de reflexion sur le Preambule de la
Constitution, Redecouvrir le Preambule de la Constitution: Rapport au President de la Republique,
by Simone Veil, (December 2008) at 61.
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such as race and ethnicity are manipulated to better deny the reality of
their impact.
Conclusion
Discussions of race, ethnicity and multiculturalism are increasingly
framed by the global circulation of ideas.111 For example, the emergence
of a demand in France for ethnic statistics often invokes cross-Atlantic
comparisons,"12 and France's changing attitudes to race have been
somewhat influenced by EU integration."3 The risk is that the debate
will be framed in broad theoretical terms that would be applicable to
all societies alike, leading to an unwarranted level of generalization.
In effect, debates on race and ethnicity are shaped by actual historical,
social and political experiences that cannot be dismissed lightly and
must be understood in context. There are imperialist dangers lurking
behind the use of global vocabularies, generally produced by the U.S., to
discuss issues whose subtle rendering must vary in each context.114 The
U.S. discourse is certainly highly informed by American specificities,
notably the significance of the experience of slavery, in ways that have not
necessarily similarly shaped the conceptual apparatus of other countries."5
To underline only one significant polarity, it may well be that industrialized
societies and Global South countries that have been on opposite ends of
racial reification processes (France and Rwanda being two among the most
significant cases in point) cannot simply trade on the same vocabulary
concerning race and ethnicity. Understanding how certain concepts of race
and anti-racism are spread through the media and capitalist culture as well
as competing and politicized academic discourses i indispensable if one
is not to be manipulated by them. 6
Paradoxically, it is only by recognizing the particularism of national
debates on these issues that one can then reconstruct them as part of a
global debate both within and between traditions of thought. That it is
often a complex and even fraught conversation (for example, Anglo-
111. Martin N Marger, Race and Ethnic Relations: American and Global Perspectives, 9th ed
(Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2011).
112. Rachel Holman, "French Minority Advocates Call for Statistics on Diversity," France 24 (28
July 2011), online: <www.france24.com/en/20110724-france-minority-leaders-advocate-statistics-
ethnic-diversity-discrimination-aneld>.
113. Gwenaele Calves, "I1 n'y pas de race ici: Le modele frangais a l'epreuve de l'integration
europeenne" (2002) 17:4 Critique Internationale 173.
114. Pierre Bourdieu & Loic Wacquant, "On the Cunning of Imperialist Reason" (1999) 16:1 Theory,
Culture & Society 41.
115. George M Fredrickson, "Mulattoes and Metis: Attitudes toward Miscegenation in the United
States and France since the Seventeenth Century" (2005) 57:183 Intl Social Science J 103.
116. Noiriel, supra note 61.
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American accusations of French hypocrisy and French contempt at Anglo-
American ethnic fragmentation)11 suggests that the debate on race and
ethnicity has itself become an inter-cultural debate woven into the fabric
of international relations, transnational cultural dialogue and law. In this
context, it is important to understand assimilationist or communitarian
practices as occurring on a spectrum and increasingly talking in terms of
each other. For example, the argument for multiculturalism is often couched
in universalist terms-as in the proposition "community identity ought
always, as a matter of principle, to be recognized as such." Conversely, the
argument for a civic citizenship neutral about citizens' identities will often
not be couched in pure universalist terms, but as expressing a particular
distinct identity that is irreducible and ought to be protected as such- as
in "a focus on civic identity is what characterizes us as French citizens.1
1 8
This is worth mentioning because the tendency of each argument to
construct itself in terms of the other is part of what makes this discussion
difficult.
Further, the mix between sensitivity to difference and attachment
to an undifferentiated notion of citizenship is one that is highly country
specific and that is particularly difficult to second-guess from outside. We
have little reason to believe that debates on race and ethnicity in the U.S.,
Indonesia, Australia, Nigeria, Guatemala, Senegal, China, Israel, Russia,
South Africa, Brazil, Germany, India or Canada are the same, especially
if we factor in complex processes of identity construction. While such
national traditions ought to be examined critically (including on their
own terms), they must also be understood as part of long-term historical
processes in which the approaches that have served a society well may not
be easily transferrable to another, even as they partake in a broad common
liberal heritage.19
By the same token, the systematic opposition to certain ideas about
race and ethnicity simply because they originated in different countries can
make for impoverished intellectual debate. Indeed, this article is premised
on the possibility that some practices at least are sufficiently similar (and
similarly problematic) to be compared dynamically. That two countries
117. Nancy L Green, "LeMelting-Pot: Made inAmerica, Produced inFrance" (1999) 86:3 J American
History 1188 at 1206.
118. In the French debate, universal republicanism is, paradoxically, a form of nationalism. Hence
it is impossible to understand it except as the defense of a particular model that is seen as a form of
resistance to globalization.
119. George M Fredrickson, "Race, Ethnicity, and National Identity in France and the United
States: A Comparative Historical Overview" (Paper delivered at the Fifth Annual Gilder Lehrman
Center International Conference at Yale University, 7-8 November 2003) [unpublished], online: Yale
University <glc.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/events/mce/Fredrickson.pdf>.
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as different as France and Rwanda should, for their own separate reasons,
have developed strict racial and ethnic blindness laws and practices
suggests that the phenomenon can be analyzed in a comparative fashion.
Martha Minow once characterized the "[c]hallenge of [d]ifference" in
terms that quite adequately echo some of the dilemmas confronting both
France and Rwanda:
The dilemma for decision-makers... is how to help overcome past
hostilities and degradation of people on the basis of group differences
without employing and, in that sense, legitimating those very
differences .... How can historical discrimination on the basis of race
and gender be overcome if the remedies themselves use the forbidden
categories of race and gender? .... Social, political, and legal reform
efforts to challenge exclusion and degradation on the basis of assigned
traits continually run up against the danger either of recreating differences
by focusing upon them or of denying their enduring influence in people's
lives. 120
In this context, the best that can probably be said is that neither race/
ethnic reification nor Jacobin ethnic blindness are inherently pro- or anti-
minority. Explicit recognition of racialized or ethnic affiliation could be
a way of paternalistically assigning to identities their own irreducible
temporalities and geographies or of enlisting the help of communities in
the prolongation of projects of state control;121 but it could just as well be
part of the complex construction of more inclusive and diverse societies.
Civic citizenship can be a form of vigorous and oppressive denial of
ethnic groups, but might be some members of these groups' best chance at
inclusion in society.
That this is the case is perhaps reinforced by the fact that members
of minorities themselves are often divided on these questions. One
can be a member of a visible minority in Canada and either embrace
multiculturalism or deplore its perceived excesses-in the context
of the so-called "Charter of Values" debate in Qudbec, there was no
absence of individuals with Muslim backgrounds who argued with the
Parti Qudbcois for greater secularism. Similarly, one can be a French
member of a minority and clamour for recognition or indignantly defend
the Republican status quo. Presumably, there are Tutsis and Hutus on
either side of the debate about the reconstruction of a race blind polity
in Rwanda. That opinions can be so starkly divided speaks, ultimately, to
120. Martha Minow, MakingAll the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion, andAmerican Law (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1990) at 47.
121. Avigail Eisenberg et al, eds, Recognition versus Self-Determination: Dilemmas ofEmancipatory
Politics (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2014).
586 The Dalhousie Law Journal
the fractured nature of racial or ethnic groups whose political agency is
inevitably exercised in contradictory ways, far from an imagined organic
"intr& de race." It also speaks, therefore, to the fundamental aporia of
race, racism, and anti-racism.
In many countries, and aside from the extreme right wing, it is also
worth acknowledging that these debates proceed within a fundamentally
common anti-racist horizon that is not as superficial as is sometimes
hinted. For example, in France the debate on ethnic statistics pits older,
more official anti-racist organizations with a long-term commitment to the
a-racial anti-racism of the French Republic (such as SOS Racisme, itself
traditionally led by "issus de l'immigration" French citizens) against more
recent and community-oriented organizations, often with strong ties in the
Afro-French or Maghreban "banlieues" communities, and a more vocal
post-colonialist discourse ("les indigbnes de la Rdpublique"). Sometimes,
organizations reflect what can only be understood as a deep internal
ambivalence. For example, the main representative organization of blacks
in France, the Conseil reprdsentatif des associations noires, is both in
favour of quotas and more active representation of African-French in the
public sphere, yet supported Frangois Hollande's proposed suppression of
the word "race" from the Constitution on the basis that race did not really
,exist." This is evidently the stuff of complex politics and it does not serve
the debate, for example, to portray minorities as inevitably pro-minority
recognition and majorities as inevitably pro-civic citizenship.
At any rate, it is anti-racism itself that is often a complex posture
precisely because racism and race are fraught concepts. Instead ofjustifying
a strong stance for or against the public highlighting of racial and ethnic
difference, the study of practices of ethnicization and de-ethnicization
brings attention to the complex dynamics of obfuscation potentially
involved in both, and the need for creative anti-racist politics. If both sets
of practices are problematic, it is less on account of some universal notion
of how identities should be managed than because of something that goes
deeper and which might be linked to how societies "imagine" themselves,
and whether they can do so in ways that do not do violence to the reality
of aspirations to recognition. Excesses of ethnicizationlde-ethnicization
often reflect a society's inability to see itself as it is, either lying to itself
about its unity/homogeneity or embracing too willingly its divisions in
ways that sacrifice the ideal of common citizenship. Both racialization and
de-racialization can be abusive in the right circumstances, therefore, in that
both can do violence to the reality to which they contribute. In this context,
the continued investment of many racialized and ethnicized minorities
in the notion of civic citizenship (few, needless to say, are tempted by
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separatism)122 combined with a demand for greater recognition suggests a
deeply dialectical relationship between racialization and de-racialization
that is a far cry from the straightforward opposition posited in French and
Rwandan official discourses. In many ways, it is through the recognition
of one's legitimate differences that one aspires to become fully equal.
Still, in the French and Rwandan contexts specifically, it is quite clear
that what is problematic are rigid projects of blindness to the continued
effects of racialization and ethnicization. One cannot simply proclaim
oneself to be a post-racial society, especially not in what remains a
deeply racialized environment. To be sure, fears about the reification of
race and ethnicity as loaded and potentially reductionist concepts have
their place and ought to be taken seriously. In this context, one may have
relatively more sympathy for Rwanda's immediate post-genocide effort
to combat the sort of hysterical racialism that was used to incite hatred
than for France's persistent reluctance to acknowledge the systemic
problem of racial discrimination (and diversity) in its midst. Rwanda's
is, paradoxically, an effort to construct a post-colonial identity that moves
beyond colonially ascribed ethnic differentiation, even if in its rush to do
so it also risks reproducing some of the worst travails of Western unitary
nation building; conversely, France suggests the urgent need to explore
ways of decolonizing the metropolitan territory, even when having dealt
with the territorial dimension of the "colonial question" may give the
illusion of an issue resolved once and for all.123
Moreover, the cognizance of ethnic and racial minority problems cannot
be held hostage to the fear that somewhere and sometime, technologies
of the state have been deployed to treat these "problems" in ways that
were illiberal and genocidal. This is especially the case in a context where
vocabularies have emerged that now allow us to speak of matters of race at
a safe distance from discourses of racism. Even the project of Rwandanit6,
therefore, is an eminently precarious and dubious one that seems to have
replaced the excesses of ultra-ethnic identification with an artificial and
oppressive concept of citizenship. To be clear, the recognition demanded
is not a recognition of inherent and irreducible differences (characteristic
of the old racialist ways) but of the legacy of racializing processes in the
shadow of civic citizenship itself: in a word, discrimination.
122. As an interesting instance of how categories of thought about race cannot easily be transposed
from one country to another, "black separatism" has to my knowledge only ever been a (relatively
minor) US phenomenon.
123. Sadri Khiari, "Social Races and Decolonial Struggles in France" in Marta Araujo & Silvia
Maeso, eds, Eurocentrism, Racism and Knowledge: Debates on History and Power in Europe and the
Americas (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015) 65.
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Perhaps what is needed, however, as a companion to discourses that
take race and ethnicity seriously is a critique of the conditions of production
of racial and ethnic labels in the first place, and the fact that one is often
forced by a majority to endorse an identity out of defensive solidarity,
when one should really never have to make such a choice. Indeed, the
privilege of the majority is that it is never called to identify itself, that it
does not have an identity, that it is the faceless face of identity assignation
to others. This is where "civic citizenship" in a country like France often
has it easy because it is never forced to reveal its problematic associations
with an implicit ethno-national project that has successfully eluded
detection through centuries of assimilationist policies. Identity politics is
presented as the business of minorities, one that majorities never feel the
need to engage in (until and unless, that is, they think they are treated as
minorities, a dangerous meme among some extreme right groups).
Seen in this light, the challenge for ethnic and racial groups suffering
from discrimination is not only or even necessarily to obtain their
recognition as such; rather, it is to uncover the conditions that make their
identification necessary or at least possible, including through the law, in
the first place. It is, moreover, to situate these conditions more generally
in an analysis of the unfolding of a global, modem and capitalist world
order. In order to do this, it is also the majority's own identity that needs to
be problematized. In the same way homosexuality has heterosexuality, or
feminism has patriarchy, races and ethnicities have a broad, partly invisible
and rarely acknowledged "whiteness" with which to reckon.124 "Blackness"
does not exist as a category in the absolute (to state the obvious, it is
doubtful any pre-colonial Africans ever considered themselves as "black")
but very much in relation to a historical construction of difference with
whiteness. George Lipsitz described "the unmarked category against
which difference is constructed, whiteness never has to speak its name,
never has to acknowledge its role as an organizing principle in social and
cultural relations."'125 Already in the colonial encounter, "the juridical
constitution of racial otherness was integral to determining the boundaries
of whiteness" as a "structuring principle of power."'126
124. Derald Wing Sue, "Whiteness and Ethnocentric Monoculturalism: Making the 'Invisible'
Visible" (2004) 59:8 American Psychologist 761 at 762.
125. George Lipsitz, "The Possessive Investment in Whiteness: Racialized Social Democracy and the
'White' Problem in American Studies" (1995) 47:3 American Q 369 at 369.
126. Renisa Mawani, Colonial Proximities: Crossracial Encounters and Juridical Truths in British
Columbia, 1871 1921 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009) at 188.
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One could argue that regimes of racial blindness are particularly in
denial of their whiteness.27 Whiteness is here both a literal whiteness, but
also more generally a stand in for the "colour" that either passes as neutral
or acts as a referent in society, and could therefore be described differently
in other societies. It is the whiteness of the "Frangais de souche,"'28 of the
"pur laines" in Qudbec, but also the whiteness of the Tutsi in post-Genocide
Rwanda, or of the Caribbean creole oligarchy.29 It is a constantly evolving
category that helps to define the "color lines." 30 Race and ethnicity are
structurally determined in relation to shades of belonging. They are at the
very source of relationships of domination that reproduce and intersect
with relations of power and class and perpetuate privilege. Seen in this
light, the struggle against racism is not only (or even so much) the struggle,
for example, of "black people" for their rights, but the problematization of
what it means to be "black" through a problematization of what it means
to be "white." Only in doing so can one hope to transcend the reproduction
of racial relations of domination and truly decolonize the French Republic
and contemporary Rwanda.
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